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Sand: Invested in Politics: Gun Jumping, Corporate Political Speech, an

NOTE
INVESTED IN POLITICS: GUN JUMPING,
CORPORATE POLITICAL SPEECH, AND CITIZENS
UNITED
I.

INTRODUCTION

In June of 2011, Groupon, Inc. ("Groupon") made the first step
toward its highly anticipated initial public stock offering ("IPO") by
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or the
"Commission").' It was projected that the deal could raise as much as
2
one billion dollars at a valuation of around twenty billion. By
September of 2011, however, it was reported that the blockbuster deal
would probably have to be delayed because of an internal email that the
Chief Executive Officer of Groupon wrote that was leaked to the press.3
How could an internal email derail the largest IPO of the year? The
concern was that the email, once leaked to the public, had violated the
quiet period imposed by the gun jumping provisions of the Securities
Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act"). 4 Thus, it is easy to see why the SEC
has also been called the "Content Regulation Commission.",5 Securities
regulation is, after all, generally the regulation of speech.6
1. See Shira Ovide, Groupon IPO: It's Here!, WALL ST. J. DEAL J. (June 2, 2011, 2:56 PM
ET), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/201 1/06/02/groupon-ipo-its-here/.
2. Id.
3. See Steven M. Davidoff, In a Quiet Period, Groupon Feels the Noise, DEALBOOK (Sept.
2, 2011, 9:03 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/09/02/in-a-quite-period-groupon-feels-the-

noise/.
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 77aa (2006); Davidoff, supra note 3. See also Peter Edmonston,
Google's LP.O., Five Years Later, DEALBOOK (Aug. 19, 2009, 9:30 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.
com/2009/08/19/googles-ipo-5-years-later/ (describing a similar gun jumping problem
encountered by Google, Inc. during its IPO in 2004).
5. Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the FirstAmendment: A PreliminaryExplorationof
Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1765, 1778 (2004) [hereinafter The Boundaries of the
FirstAmendment].
6. Roberta S. Karmel, The First Amendment and Government Regulation of Economic
Markets, 55 BROOK. L. REv. 1, 1 (1989). At the most basic level, the SEC regulates the securities
industry by compelling and reviewing speech in the form of written documents attesting to the
financial health and character of a company, asks for changes to those statements, and files suit as
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Accordingly, scholars have argued over the constitutionality of
securities regulations.7 Their analyses have tended to approach the issue
within the framework of the commercial speech doctrine. However, the
U.S. Supreme Court's recent holding in Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission9 suggests that constitutional protections of
corporate political speech are also ripe for use in challenges to the
restriction and compulsion of disclosure by the SEC.10
The gun jumping provisions of the securities laws present a
particularly auspicious target for a constitutional challenge. 1 The gun
jumping provisions restrict the ability of corporations and other parties
involved in a new stock offering to make offers to sell those securities
prior to an SEC mandated registration statement becoming effective. 1
These gun jumping provisions have been a popular target amongst
scholars challenging the constitutionality of securities regulations
because they restrict a broad range of speech by limiting the ability of
those parties to make "offers," a term that is defined broadly by the
SEC. 13 Thus, the gun jumping provisions present a sort of head-on
collision with the First Amendment. 14 When the SEC's gun jumping
restrictions are viewed within the newly broad political speech
framework articulated in Citizens United, it is likely they cannot survive
a constitutional challenge.' 5 Accordingly, it is clear that the Citizens
United holding must be limited to its facts or overturned in order to
punishment when those statements are considered materially misleading. See JAMES D. COX ET AL.,
SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 3-5 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 6th ed. 2009).

Further, in the case of gun jumping regulations, SEC regulation acts to limit the kinds of public
statements a company can make to the public even before the filings process occurs. Id. at 160.
7. See infra Part III.B.
8. See, e.g., Lloyd L. Drury, 1m, Disclosure Is Speech: Imposing Meaningful First
Amendment Constraints on SEC Regulatory Authority, 58 S.C. L. REV. 757, 759 (2007); Burt
Neubome, The First Amendment and Government Regulation of Capital Markets, 55 BROOK. L.
REV. 5,5-6 (1989); Antony Page & Katy Yang, Controlling Corporate Speech: Is Regulation Fair
Disclosure Unconstitutional?, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 37, 47-48 (2005); Arthur R. Pinto, The
Nature of the Capital Markets Allows a Greater Role for the Government, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 77,
78-79 (1989).
9. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
10. See infra Part III.D.
11. See Michael R. Siebecker, Corporate Speech, Securities Regulation, and an Institutional
Approach to the First Amendment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 613, 656-58 (2006); Edward T.
Highberger, Note, Not So Fast! Scrutinizing the "Gun Jumping" Provisions of the Securities Act
Under the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2141, 2160 (2008).
12. Eric A. Chiappinelli, Gun Jumping: The Problem of Extraneous Offers of Securities, 50 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 457,458-59, 466-67 (1989); Siebecker, supra note 11, at 656.
13. See Chiappinelli, supra note 12, at 458-59, 461; Siebecker, supra note 11, at 656;
Highberger, supra note 11, at 2160.
14. See Neubome, supra note 8, at5l &n.152.
15. See infra Parts II.C., IV.B.
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allow for necessary government regulation of corporate activities, and
for the SEC to shift its focus from predominantly regulating and
punishing speech to regulating and punishing the actual bad acts and
actors that victimize investors and the markets.16
This Note will examine the SEC's gun jumping regulations, the
interaction of those regulations with First Amendment political speech
protections, and those regulations' constitutionality in light of Citizens
United. Part II of this Note will discuss the background to this issue by
looking at the nature and development of the SEC's disclosure regime
and of corporate political speech protections under the First Amendment.
This Note will then discuss the holding and impact of Citizens United
and its implications for the future. Part III of this Note will identify and
discuss the problem posed by the intersection of constitutional free
speech protections and the gun jumping provisions of the securities laws,
examine previous approaches to the problem, and recognize the
elevating effect that Citizens United has on the issue. Part IV of this Note
will discuss why gun jumping restrictions and similar restrictions on
truthful speech are incompatible with the Supreme Court's view of
corporate political speech in Citizens United and, thus, must be
unconstitutional, and why there is no persuasive policy reason for the
Court to uphold the gun jumping provisions in the face of the First
Amendment. Finally, Part V of this Note will discuss how First
Amendment doctrine should be developed to avoid undermining the
current system of securities regulation, and how the SEC can attain its
goals of adequate disclosure and investor protection without violating
the First Amendment.
II.

CORPORATE SPEECH, SECURITIES REGULATION, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT

It is strange to think that well-established parts of the current
securities regulation regime could be unconstitutional. However, it
seems equally incongruent that a system of federal government
regulation based largely on the control of speech, like our current
17
securities regulation regime, could coexist with the First Amendment.
So how do we reconcile the securities regulation regime with the First
Amendment? This question is particularly difficult to answer in light of
the Court's recent decision in Citizens United, which included the
assertion that "the Government lacks the power to ban corporations from

16.
17.

See infra Part V.
See The Boundaries of the FirstAmendment, supra note 5, at 1778.
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speaking."' 18 This confusion is only compounded by the Court, which has
made passing references to the application of the First Amendment to
securities regulation but has never dealt directly with the issue. 19
The problem of attempting to reconcile the current system of
securities regulation with First Amendment doctrine stems from the
considerable growth and judicial development that both areas have
undergone since the Securities Act became law. 20 Indeed, when the SEC
was established, the First Amendment was considered inapplicable to
securities regulation because First Amendment protections had yet to be
extended to either commercial speech or govermnent-compelled
speech.21 To what degree the First Amendment can be applied to
securities regulations today is still unclear.2 2 However, with securities
regulations built around a system of compelling and restricting speech
disclosure on the one hand, and corporate speech protections that define
limits on the ability of government to control speech on the other, the
two bodies of law are clearly on a collision course. Therefore, any
attempt to reconcile the two with one another must begin with a
fundamental understanding of each.
A.

Compelled and Restricted Disclosurein the Registration Process

Congress enacted the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") 24 in the wake of the Great Depression
as part of President Roosevelt's New Deal.2 5 The Securities Act and
Exchange Act, while often seen as a response to the stock market crash
of 1929, were actually instituted in response to complaints of fraud,
manipulation, and significant public pressure on the government to "do
18. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 903 (2010).
19. Antony Page, Taking Stock of the First Amendment's Application to Securities Regulation,
58 S.C. L. REV. 789, 790, 797-800 (2007); Highberger, supra note 1I,at 2149. But see Drury, supra
note 8, at 759, 765 (suggesting that there is a "strong presumption.., that securities regulation was
not subject to constitutional protections available for free speech").
20. See Page, supra note 19, at 793-797 (discussing the development of commercial speech
doctrine); Page & Yang, supra note 8, at 10-11 (discussing development and interpretation of
certain securities regulation statutes and rules); Siebecker, supra note 11, at 636-41 (discussing the
development of corporate political speech doctrine).
21. Page, supra note 19, at 789-90.
22. Id. at 797 (discussing the sparse record of cases touching on the relationship between
securities regulations and the First Amendment, none of which deal with the issue directly).
23. Siebecker, supra note 11, at 621, 651 (describing the "impending jurisprudential collision"
of First Amendment doctrines through the framework of securities regulation and arguing to resolve
the conflict through an "institutional approach").
24. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
25. Susan M. Phillips & J. Richard Zecher, The Securities Exchange Commission: Where
From, Where to?, in SECOND THOUGHTS: MYTHS AND MORALS OF U.S. ECONOMIC HISTORY 136,
137-38 (Donald N. McCloskey ed., 1993).
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something" to combat the lengthy period of economic stagnation
following the crash of 1929.26 Thus, it was not until five years after the
1929 crash and amidst considerable debate that the Securities Act passed
into law.27 The goal was to ensure investors were provided with the
material information necessary to make informed investment decisions
and to prohibit fraud in the sale of securities. 28 The Exchange Act gave
teeth to the Securities Act in 1934 by creating the SEC, providing for
liability in some cases, and setting requirements for the registration of
securities traded on national exchanges with the SEC, periodic financial
reporting, registration of exchanges and broker-dealers, and adding
further antifraud provisions.29
Today, the Securities Act and the Exchange Act form the
significant regulatory structure that controls the securities markets,3 °
along with the rules and regulations propagated by the SEC and lesserknown acts like the Trust Indenture Act of 1939,31 the Investment
Company Act of 1940,32 and the Investment Advisors Act of 1940.13 The
SEC regulates the markets through a two-pronged system of controlled
disclosure and antifraud policies in line with the two main policy goals

26. Id. at 136-37.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 137.
29. Id. at 138; Drury, supra note 8, at 764. President Hoover had originally resisted the idea of
significant federal regulation of the markets, preferring instead a scheme of state and self-regulation.
Phillips & Zecher, supra note 25, at 136. However, after Hoover's pleas to the New York Stock
Exchange to eliminate market manipulation were essentially ignored, Hoover initiated a Senate
investigation that provided headlines of market manipulation throughout the 1932 presidential
campaign. Id. at 137. It was the political pressure from this investigation that drove the passage of
the Securities Act and the Exchange Act rather than concern for the market activities that had caused
the 1929 crash. Id. It is worth noting that even after significant examples of market manipulation
were uncovered, President Hoover advocated that only specific wrongdoings should be punished
and continued to question the constitutional authority of securities regulation generally. Id. It is
further worth noting that the Securities Act provided for the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") to
regulate the national securities exchanges. Id. The creation of the SEC was actually a concession
fought for and won by the New York investment community, hoping that the private sector would
be able to exercise greater control over the Commission. Id. at 138. These hopes were largely
disappointed, however, when three former members of the FTC were appointed to the Commission.
Id. In the end, the sole representative of the private sector on the initial Commission was its
chairman, Joseph Kennedy. Id. The utility of federal regulation under the SEC quickly became
apparent, with early actions of the FTC including the shuttering of nine exchanges including a oneman "exchange" located in a poolroom in Hammond, Indiana. See id.
30. Drury, supra note 8, at 763-64.
31. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
32. Pub. L. No. 768, 54 Stat. 789 (1940) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-I to 80a-64 (2006 &
Supp. IV 2011)).
33. Pub. L. No. 768, 54 Stat. 847 (1940) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-I to 80b-21 (2006 &
Supp. IV 2011)).
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of the Securities Act.34 The general goal of the system is to promote
efficiency, fairness, and integrity in the capital markets by equipping
investors with material information about a stock and its issuer through
mandatory disclosure.35 By choosing this method of regulation, Congress
initiated a regulatory structure essentially predicated on the control of
corporate speech.36
In addition to mandating disclosure of certain information, the
Securities Act and the rules promulgated by the SEC also significantly
restrict corporate speech.37 Section 5(c) of the Securities Act prohibits
any person from offering to sell or buy a security unless a registration
statement disclosing certain information about the security has been filed
with the SEC and is in effect.38 When a premature offer is made, it is
referred to as "gun jumping. '39 The term "offer" is given an expansive
definition by the courts and the SEC.40 Section 2(a)(3) of the Securities
Act states that the term "'offer' shall include every attempt or offer to
dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a
security, for value."' 1 The SEC further expanded the definition to
include everything that "condition[s] the public mind or arouse[s] public
interest in the particular securities., 42 This expansion swept a wide range
of speech beyond what a layman would consider to be an offer within
the purview of the SEC.43
These restrictions apply to a broad range of persons beyond the
issuer itself.44 Section 5 of the Securities Act also applies to underwriters

34. See Phillips & Zecher, supra note 25, at 137; Drury, supra note 8, at 764.
35. Phillips & Zecher, supra note 25, at 137; Drury, supra note 8, at 764-65.
36. See Drury, supra note 8, at 771-72, 779 (arguing that SEC disclosure is commercial
speech).
37. See Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 230.135 (2011).
38. Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c); Chiappinelli, supra note 12, at 459.
Section 5(c) specifically states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to make use of any means or
instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to
offer to sell or offer to buy through the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise
any security, unless a registration statement has been filed as to such security, or while
the registration statement is the subject of a refusal order or stop order or (prior to the
effective date of the registration statement) any public proceeding or examination under
section 77h of this title.
Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c).
39. Chiappinelli, supra note 12, at 466.
40. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
41. Id.
42. In re Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co., 38 S.E.C. 843, 850 (1959); Chiappinelli, supra note
12, at 461.
43. See Chiappinelli, supra note 12, at461.
44. Id. at 467.
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and dealers.4 5 Similarly to the SEC's treatment of the term "offer," the
46
An
term "underwriter" is also given an expansive definition.
"underwriter" is defined by the Securities Act:
[Any person who has purchased from an issuer with a view to, or
offers or sells for an issuer in connection with, the distribution of any
security, or participates or has a direct or indirect participation in any
such undertaking, or participates or has a participation in the direct or
indirect underwriting of any such undertaking .... 47
Therefore, the tight restrictions imposed by the Securities Act apply to a
broad swath of persons well beyond the traditional meaning of
"underwriter.' 48
The restrictions on offers under Section 5(c) of the Securities Act
also extend temporally to the so-called pre-filing period prior to the
submission of a registration statement. 49 This pre-filing quiet period is
considered to have taken effect thirty days prior to the filing of the
registration statement. 50 Thus, the current securities regime places
significant restrictions on corporate speech both before and after a
registration statement is filed. 51 Any statement that can be seen as
conditioning the market for the sale of a security during this so-called
quiet period could offend Section 5.52 Corporate advertising provides a
useful example of the chilling effect Section 5 may have on corporate
speech.53 While the SEC encourages stock issuers to continue normal

45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(l1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(ll) (2006). The definition
continues:
[S]uch term shall not include a person whose interest is limited to a commission from an
underwriter or dealer not in excess of the usual and customary distributors' or sellers'
commission. As used in this paragraph the term 'issuer' shall include, in addition to an
issuer, any person directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by the issuer, or any
person under direct or indirect common control with the issuer.
Id.
48. See Chiappinelli, supra note 12, at467-68.
49. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.163A(a) (2011); see also Chiappinelli, supra note 12, at 458-59;
Siebecker, supra note 11, at 656.
50. 17 C.F.R. § 230.163A(a); Highberger, supranote 11, at 2163-64.
51. See Page, supra note 19, at 803-06. Professor Eric Chiappinelli observes that similar
restrictions on speech actually continue beyond the effective date of a registration statement.
Chiappinelli, supra note 12, at 459 & n.1 4 . In this period, while offers are of course permitted, they
must be preceded or accompanied by a final prospectus. Id. Thus the same actions of an offeror
could be gun jumping or an improper offer in violation of the securities laws, with the only
difference being the time at which the offer is made. Id. at 467. Because of this negligible
difference, Professor Chiappinelli refers to all such improper offers as "extraneous offers." Id.
52. See Chiappinelli, supra note 12, at 459,461.
53. See Siebecker, supra note 11, at 656.
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advertising practices during the quiet period, a significant increase in
advertising, even advertising that does not mention a securities offering,
can be considered gun jumping in violation of Section 5(c) of the
Securities Act.54
However, there are some SEC rules that ease this substantial
regulatory burden. 5" SEC Rule 135 provides a safe harbor for statements
concerning an impending securities sale made during the quiet period as
long as the comments fall within eight specific categories of limited
information. 56 Additionally, SEC Rules 163, 168, and 169 substantially
reduce the threat of a Section 5 violation by providing exemptions for
seasoned issuers of stock, so long as their offers are preceded or
accompanied by a prospectus that discloses specified information, and
for the release of certain regularly released business information.57
However, any issuer who does not meet these exceptions, or an issuer
seeking to make an IPO will still be subject to the strict prohibitions of
Section 5 of the Securities Act and SEC Rule 135.58
The chilling effect of the gun jumping restrictions is compounded
by the substantial cost and delay that an issuer, underwriter, or dealer
may incur for a gun jumping violation. 59 A violator may be civilly liable
under Section 12(a) of the Securities Act and may be criminally liable
for a willful violation under Section 24 of the Securities Act. 60 A
violation occurs whenever the requirements of Section 5 and SEC Rule
135 are not met, regardless of the intent of the defendant. 6' Additionally,
a violator may be liable even where the defendant later complied with
the requirements of the statute and the policies underlying the gun
jumping requirements have not been defeated.62 Indeed, no evidence of
causation is even required for a plaintiff to sue for a violation of Section

54. Id. An example of this would be if an issuer who has never previously engaged in public
advertising instituted a new advertising campaign during the quiet period. See, e.g., Georgeson &
Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,118 (Mar.
3, 1977). While the advertising may be factual and may not reference the issuing of a security, the
drastic increase in publicity may give rise to an inference that the issuer is advertising for the
purpose of priming the market for its issue and may give rise to a gun jumping problem. See id.
55. Siebecker, supranote 11, at 656-57.
56. 17 C.F.R. § 230.135(a) (2011); see also Siebecker, supra note 11, at 656. It is illustrative
of the limited nature of these exceptions to point out that while the "basic terms" of the offering are
permitted, "basic terms" does not include the share price unless the offer is to employees of the
issuer or an offering of rights to existing shareholders. Highberger, supra note 11, at 2164-65.
57. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.163, .168 to .169.
58. Siebecker, supra note 11, at 657.
59. Securities Act of 1933 § 12(a), 15 U.S.C. § 771(a); § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (2006).
60. Securities Act of 1933 § 12(a), 15 U.S.C. § 771(a); § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x.
61. Chiappinelli, supranote 12, at 463.
62. Id.
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5 of the Securities Act.63 A violation may be actionable even where the
defendant did not cause the plaintiff's damages, or where the plaintiff
suffered no damages. 64 Additionally, all waivers of a plaintiff's right to
sue for a gun jumping violation are invalid according to Section 14 of
the Securities Act.65 Thus, any issuer of stock subject to Section 5 of the
Securities Act runs an unusually high risk of liability for any mistake
made in the offering process. 66
Additionally, the SEC may investigate and seek injunctive relief for
Section 5 violations.67 While investigating any party related to an
offering, the SEC may delay the effective date of the registration
statement, 68 and may discipline parties for willful violations. 69 Thus,
even though a gun jumping violation does not result in private litigation,
the issuer may still be subject to substantial cost and delay at the hands
of the SEC.7 ° It is clear that the strict requirements and prohibitions of
the securities regulation regime described in this section place
substantial burdens and prohibitions on both corporate and personal
speech. 71 Accordingly, the current regulation regime is particularly
difficult to justify from a modem First Amendment framework.72
B. CorporateSpeech and the FirstAmendment
Corporations have enjoyed constitutional rights since 1886. 73
However it took until 1976 for First Amendment protections7 4 to be
extended to corporations.75 Since then, the bounds of corporate free
speech protections have been developed in a line of cases divided into
two supposedly distinct doctrines: the commercial speech doctrine and
the political speech doctrine.76 A different standard of review is applied

63. Id.
64. Securities Act of 1933 § 12(a), 15 U.S.C. § 771 (stating that a plaintiff may recover the
cost of the security with interest, but "less the amount of any income received" from the security);
Chiappinelli, supra note 12, at 463.
65. Securities Act of 1933 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n.
66. See Chiappinelli, supra note 12, at 463-64.
67. Securities Act of 1933 § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(c); § 20(a)-(b), § 77t(a)-(b).
68. 17 C.F.R. § 230.461(b) (2011).
69. Securities Act of 1933 § 15(b)(4)(D)-(E), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(D)-(E).
70. See Chiappinelli, supranote 12, at 466.
71. Siebecker, supra note 11, at 655.
72. Id.
73. Page, supra note 19, at 793 (citing Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394,
396 (1886)).
74. "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ....
U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
75. Page, supra note 19, at 793.
76. See Neubome, supra note 8, at 5-6.
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for each doctrine, yielding two different conceptions of, and limitations
to, corporate speech.77 This history of development evidences an
increasingly broad understanding of corporate speech protections by the
Supreme Court and provides a strong indication that the Court could find
portions of current law, such as the gun jumping provisions of the
securities laws, unconstitutional. 78
The commercial speech doctrine essentially originated in Valentine
v. Chrestensen,7 9 which erected a strict structural divide between various
kinds of speech.8 ° Under Valentine, speech that implicated religious or
political expression received the highest level of protection while speech
that would be defined as commercial today received no protection
whatsoever. 81 This changed in 1976 when the Supreme Court held in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc.82 that truthful speech that proposed a legal commercial
transaction was constitutionally protected speech.83 The Court's rationale
for this shift toward a more inclusive understanding of First Amendment
protections was predominantly that the public had an interest in hearing
the commercial speech.84 The Court also noted that commercial speech
was subject to greater regulation than non-commercial speech, noting
specifically that false or misleading speech could be regulated. 85 The
Court did not, however, articulate a meaningful way to identify
commercial speech.86
Four years later, the Court articulated the modem standard of the
commercial speech doctrine in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Commission.87 In Central Hudson, the Court articulated a
four-part analysis to determine whether a restriction to commercial
speech was constitutional.8 8 First, to even qualify for possible protection,
the speech must relate to lawful activity and not be misleading.89 Second,
8 29

62
- .
77. Siebecker, supra note 11, at
78. See Highberger, supra note 11, at 2142-48.
79. 316 U.S. 52 (1942), overruled by Va. State Rd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
80. Id. at 54; Neubome, supra note 8, at 17.
81. Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54; Neuborne, supra note 8, at 9-11.
82. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
83. Id. at 770; Page, supra note 19, at 793. It is important to note that prior decisions of the
Court had impliedly extended First Amendment protections to commercial speech. Id. at 793 n.13.
84. Va. State Bd. of Phannacy,425 U.S. at 763-64; Page, supra note 19, at 793.
85. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770-72 & n.24; Siebecker, supra note 11, at 63031.
86. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 771 n.24; Siebecker, supra note 11, at 631.
87. 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
88. Id.
89. Id.
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for a restriction to be constitutional, a substantial governmental interest
must support the restriction.9" Third, the restriction must directly
advance the substantial governmental interest. 91 Fourth, the restriction
must not be more expansive than necessary to serve the substantial
governmental interest. 92 By creating this test, the Court applied an
intermediate standard of review, a less rigorous standard than the strict
scrutiny applied in political speech cases. 93 This test has drawn more
than its fair share of criticism, including from the Supreme Court justices
themselves.9 4
The commercial speech doctrine also provides some limited
protection against compelled speech, a protection that may apply when
the speaker is a corporation.95 However, this protection is generally
easily outweighed by consumer protection concerns. 96 Despite this, the
Court has struck down some statutes that compel commercial corporate
speech on First Amendment grounds. 97
Additionally, in CentralHudson the Court again failed to provide a
meaningful way of separating commercial speech from other kinds of
protected speech. 98 Indeed, the Court has since admitted that ambiguities
sometimes exist in determining whether certain speech falls within the
commercial speech doctrine, and that no precise definition of
commercial speech exists.99 Accordingly, some scholars have expressed
significant concern that this ambiguity will allow for speech that should
be entitled to higher protection under the First Amendment to be
suppressed under the commercial speech doctrine. 00 Others, in turn,
have expressed concern that speech that should be subject to greater
regulation may be able to escape regulation by deliberately mixing
commercial speech with speech that triggers a higher standard of
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Page, supra note 19, at 793-94.
94. Id. at 794 (citing Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367-68 (2002)
(acknowledging the reservations of several justices to applying the CentralHudson test)).
95. Id. at 794-95.
96. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (holding
that corporations may be compelled to put warnings or disclaimers on their products in order to
reduce the possibility of consumer confusion or deception).
97. Page, supra note 19, at 794-95. See also United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405,
408-09, 416 (2001) (holding that mushroom growers could not be compelled to contribute to
advertising where there was no risk of consumer deception).
98. Page, supra note 19, at795.
99. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 419 (1993); Page, supra
note 19, at 795 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 765 (1993)) (discussing the difficulties of
identifying what constitutes commercial speech).
100. Page, supra note 19, at795.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2014

11

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 15

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:309

review.' 0 ' Still others argue that the dichotomy between commercial and
economic speech is essentially meaningless and a cover for the
difference between hearer-centered and speaker-centered models of First
Amendment protection. 10 2 These concerns are indicative of the
traditional high regard given to the protection of free speech and still
afforded by the strict protections of the political speech doctrine.103
Political speech tends to receive the highest protection afforded
under the First Amendment. 1°4 Indeed, the protection of political
deliberation and commentary is recognized as the core purpose of the
First Amendment. 10 5 Accordingly, any regulations affecting political
06
speech are subject to strict scrutiny and rarely survive judicial review.
Under strict scrutiny, the government must show that the restriction at
issue "furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve
that interest."10 7 However, until the Court's decision in Citizens United,
this strict standard seemed to be more flexible when applied to corporate
political speech. 10 8 Rather, the protection afforded corporate political
speech, while still more substantial then the protections afforded
10 9
corporate commercial speech, seemed to vary depending on context.
Generally, corporations were afforded equivalent political speech
protection to non-corporate speakers.1 1 0
Indicative of this approach is First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti,111 in which the Court struck down a Massachusetts criminal
statute that prohibited corporations from trying to influence voter
opinion on ballot issues not related to the corporation's own business
interest with monetary contributions. 112 In its decision, the Court focused
on the interest of the general public in hearing political speech. 13 The
101.
102.
103.

See Siebecker, supra note 11, at 657-58.
See Neuborne, supra note 8, at 12-15.
See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Page & Yang, supranote 8, at 6; Siebecker, supra note I1, at

636.
104.

Siebecker, supra note 11, at 636.

105. Id. (citations omitted).
106. Id.
107. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010) (quoting FEC v. Wis.Right to Life,
Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court also noted,
"it might be maintained that political speech simply cannot be banned or restricted as a categorical
matter." Id. (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 124 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
108. See Siebecker, supra note 11, at 636 (noting that in the context of an upcoming election
corporate political speech was subject to greater regulation than non-corporate political speech).
109. Id.
110. Id.
Ill. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
112. id. at 767, 784.
113. Id. at 777, 783, 791-92. See also Siebecker, supra note 11, at 637.
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Court noted that "[t]he inherent worth of the speech in terms of its
capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its
source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual." ' 4 The
Court's approach, however,
seemed to change in the context of an
5
impending election."
In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,'16 the Supreme Court
upheld a statute that prohibited corporations from using their general
treasury funds for independent expenditures opposing or supporting
candidates in state elections." 7 The Court based its holding on the
concept that significant corporate influence on the electoral process has
substantial negative effects8 and garners the corporation an unfair
advantage in public debate."
The Court affirmed this line of reasoning in McConnell v. Federal
Election Commission.119 In McConnell, the Court upheld a federal
regulation that barred corporations from using general treasury funds to
create advertisements that mention a candidate's name within sixty days
of an election. 20 In so holding, the Court recognized the government's
substantial interest in combating "the corrosive and distorting effects of
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of
the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's
support for the corporation's political ideas."' 12' Prior to the Supreme
Court's holding in Citizens United, this more flexible, contextual
approach to corporate political speech seemed to indicate at least some
willingness of the Court to allow for the regulation of political speech in
furtherance of a compelling enough government interest. 22 However,
Citizens United-throwing into doubt the ability of the government to
regulate political speech absent an extraordinarily compelling state
23
interest-overruled both Austin and, in part, McConnell.1
One conceptualization of the different approaches applied by the
commercial speech doctrine and the political speech doctrine, as well as
by various courts in general, is the difference between a speaker-

114. Belotti, 435 U.S. at 777.
115. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 664 (1990), overruled by
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
116. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
117. Id. at 655, 664, 669.
118. Id. at658-60.
119. 540 U.S. 93, 205 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
120. Id. at 204-05, 246.
121. Id. at 205 (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 660) (internal quotation marks omitted).
122. See id. (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 660).
123. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886, 913. Portions of McConnell that did not deal with this
issue, however, remain good law. Id. at 913.
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centered and hearer-centered First Amendment doctrine. 124 In a speakercentered construction of the First Amendment, speech on religion,
science, politics, and arts is protected based on the inherent right of the
speaker to speak. 125 This represents a non-instrumental approach to free
speech protections because the value of the speech has nothing to do
with its protected status. 26 Rather, the speech is protected because of "a
toleration driven respect for the dignity of the self-affirming speaker and
a prophylactic refusal127to permit the government to pick and choose who
should be tolerated."'
National Socialist Party v. Village of Skokie' 28 presents the classic
example of a speaker-centered theory of the First Amendment.129 In
Skokie, the Court easily overturned a state injunction preventing a Nazi
group from parading swastikas and distributing literature that incited
hatred against people of the Jewish faith. 130 Certainly the Court did not
think that there was any value to society in hearing the Nazi's speech,
but rather their right to speak on their political beliefs was protected by a
constitutional commitment to toleration under a speaker-centered model
of the First Amendment. 13' Thus, the speaker-centered model32 best
explains the Court's approach under the political speech doctrine.
A hearer-centered model of free speech, however, better represents
the commercial speech doctrine. 133 A hearer-centered model of the First
Amendment expanded on the earlier speaker-centered model by
recognizing and protecting the interest of hearers in hearing certain
speech.134 To do so, the court engages in the very instrumentalist
analysis that it shunned under a speaker-centered model by placing a
value on the speech itself and engaging in a standard cost-benefit
analysis. 35 Therefore, a hearer has a First Amendment right to hear
speech that will inform them or allow them to act more efficiently, but6
no interest or right whatsoever to hear false or harmful information.1
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy represents the classic hearer-centered
124.
centered
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Neubome, supra note 8, at 13-28 (discussing in detail the difference between hearerand speaker-centered conceptions of the First Amendment).
Id. at 25.
Id.
Id.
432 U.S. 43 (1977).
Neubome, supra note 8, at 17.
Skokie, 432 U.S. at 43-44.
Neubome, supra note 8, at 17-19.
See Skokie, 432 U.S. at 43-44; Neuborne, supra note 8, at 17-18.
See Neubome, supra note 8, at 28, 30.
Id.at 25.
Id.
Id. at 25-26.
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model of the First Amendment applied in a commercial speech
context. 137 In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the Court held that the
right of pharmacists to advertise the cost of their products was
constitutionally protected because of the public's interest in being better
informed38and thus better able to make a choice in their own best
interest.1
The distinction between a speaker-centered and a hearer-centered
model of the First Amendment does not, however, clarify the blurred
line between commercial and political speech. 139 Rather, the distinction
between speaker-centered and hearer-centered protections of free speech
become problematic when strong speaker and hearer interests run
contrary to each other in the same cases, such as where there are face-toface racial or sexual slurs. 40 Additional problems arise when the parties
at issue fit into neither the classical speaker nor hearer categories, but are
rather bystanders, conduits for speech, or government regulators.14 1 In
these instances, the Court must recognize and attempt to 42balance the
myriad of interests present, resulting in a truly blurry result.1
Another distinction that may account for the discrepancies in the
level of protection given to different types of corporate speech, as well
as provide a window to the level of protection likely to be applied by a
court, is the distinction between truthful speech and misleading
speech. 143 Generally, the Court is extremely averse to the restriction of
truthful speech in the name of protecting the public. 144 In the securities
regulation context, this sentiment was most strongly laid out in Basic
Inc. v. Levinson 145 when the Court refused to take a paternalistic

137. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770
(1976); Neubome, supra note 8, at 30-31.
138. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770 (noting that this approach was preferential to
the "highly paternalistic" theory that the public's access to information through advertising should
be limited so they can not make poor choices for themselves, in this case opting for cheaper but subpar pharmaceuticals).
139. See Neuborne, supra note 8, at 25.
140. Id. at 23 (citations omitted).
141. Id. at24-25.
142. See id.
143. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 234 (1988); see also Drury, supra note 8, at
780, 782.
144. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (noting that a
state may regulate commercial speech to protect consumers from misleading or deceptive speech,
but may not prohibit the dissemination of truthful, non-misleading speech for reasons unrelated to
the preservation of a fair bargaining process); Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 234; Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 773 (1976) (noting that the State
could not "completely suppress the dissemination of concededly truthful information about entirely
lawful activity, fearful of that information's effect upon its disseminators and its recipients").
145. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
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approach to investor protection because "[d]isclosure, and not
paternalistic withholding of accurate information, is the policy chosen
,,146
On the other hand, the Court has been
and expressed by Congress.
more willing to suppress misleading speech. 147 This is illustrated by the
threshold requirement of the Central Hudson test that commercial
speech must relate to a lawful activity and not be misleading in order to
be eligible for protection under the commercial speech doctrine. 48 This
preference for the protection of truthful speech thus provides another
model for understanding when and why 49
the Court will protect some
speech more vigorously then other speech. 1
C. Citizens United and a Wider View of CorporatePoliticalSpeech
Protections
It is Citizens United however, the most recent case to address the
issue of corporate speech protections, that provides the broadest and
fiercest articulation of corporate free speech to date. 50 By overturning
two previous Supreme Court decisions, Austin and McConnell, and
issuing an opinion filled with broad inclusive language expressing an
inflexible view of political speech protections under the First
Amendment, Citizens United signals an increased willingness of the
Court to strike down government regulations in the name of protecting
corporate political speech.' 5 ' Accordingly, Citizens United is a powerful
new precedent with which to challenge virtually any
form of government
52
regulation that touches corporate political speech.
In Citizens United, the Court struck down Section 203 of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (the "BCRA"),' 5 3 which
prohibited corporations and unions from using general treasury funds for
express advocacy or electioneering communication. 154 Electioneering
communication is defined as "any broadcast, cable, or satellite
communication which.., refers to a clearly identified candidate for
146. Id. at 234.
147. See 44 Liquormart,Inc., 517 U.S. at 501; Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
148. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
149. See Drury, supra note 8, at 780.
150. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 900, 904-05, 911-13 (2010).
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified as
amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (2006)), invalidatedby Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876
(2010) (holding "2 U.S.C. § 441b's restrictions on corporate independent expenditures"
unconstitutional).
154. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887, 917.
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Federal office" and is 55made within thirty days of a primary or sixty days
of a general election.
The government defended the statute on the same four central
156
justifications that the Court had upheld in Austin and McConnell.
First, the government argued it had a compelling interest in regulating
corporate political speech to prevent corporations from gaining "an
unfair advantage in the political marketplace by using resources amassed
in the economic marketplace.' 5 7 The idea was that the massive size and
resources of some corporations would allow them to distort the tenor of
political debate, and that the government should be allowed to equalize
the ability of individuals and groups to influence elections. 58 Second,
the government argued that it should be allowed to regulate corporate
political speech in order to prevent corruption or the appearance of
corruption. 159 Third, the government argued it could limit the political
speech of corporations in order to protect dissenting shareholders from
being compelled to fund speech that they disagree with.' 60 Fourth, the
government argued it had a compelling interest in preventing foreign
individuals or associations from influencing American political
elections.161 The Court in Citizens United, however, found all of these
same interests that had been upheld in Austin and McConnell to be
insufficient to defeat the62 general First Amendment protections of
corporate political speech.
The overruling of Austin and McConnell alone represents a
significant shift in the Court's attitude toward the nature of corporate
political speech by stiffening one of the few areas where political speech
protections had been flexible. 163 However, the extremely broad language
emphasized in Citizens United demonstrates a still greater shift in the
Court's view of corporate political speech to one that sees corporate
political speech as almost universally inviolate.164 Accordingly, the
155. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A).
156.

See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904,908,911.

157.

Id. at 904 (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659 (1990))

(internal quotation marks omitted).
158. See id. This is the so-called "antidistortion rationale." Id.

159.

Id. at 908. One response of the Court to this contention was simply to conclude that

"independent expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or

the appearance of corruption." Id. at 909.
160. Id. at 911.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.
Id. at 904, 909-11.
See id. at 913, 917; Siebecker, supra note 11, at 636.
See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913 ("No sufficient governmental interest justifies limits

on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.").
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Court makes a point of repeatedly emphasizing that the government
cannot suppress
political speech on the basis of the speaker's corporate
165
identity.
Further, the Court made broad statements that seem custom fit for
application to the current securities regulation regime. 166 In debunking
the antidistortion rational of Austin, the Court stated:
When the Government seeks to use its full power, including the
criminal law, to command where a person may get his or her
information or what distrusted source he or she may not hear, it uses
censorship to control thought. This is unlawful.
67 The First Amendment
confirms the freedom to think for ourselves. 1
In holding that the government's interest in protecting dissenting
shareholders from being compelled to fund political statements averse to
their own views, the Court scolded, "the remedy is not to restrict speech
but to consider and explore other regulatory mechanisms. The regulatory
168
mechanism here, based on speech, contravenes the First Amendment."
The Court further noted that "[o]ur Nation's speech dynamic is
changing, and informative voices should not have to circumvent onerous
restrictions to exercise their First Amendment rights."' 169 Finally, in
expressly overruling Austin, the Court held that "[n]o sufficient
governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit
or for-profit corporations." 170 Taken together, these statements form an
extremely rigid approach to the First Amendment that holds political
171
speech as almost universally inviolate.
Indeed, the Court only takes a reprieve from this expansive rhetoric
to note a narrow band of exceptions where the government's interest in
allowing its entities to function require limits on speech to the
disadvantage of certain classes of persons. 172 While it seems that this
exception could shelter the SEC and the current securities regulation
regime from constitutional challenge, the examples cited by the Court
are all examples in which either the federal or state government itself is
165. Id.at900, 904-05, 913.
166. See id.
at908, 911-13.
167. Id.at908. This statement alone seems to support a constitutional challenge to the entire
framework of gun jumping since gun jumping aims to do exactly what this statement forbids-it
compels investors to get all of their information regarding a security from tightly censored
statements in the form of prospectuses by forbidding the issuing corporation from supplying any
other information to the market. See supra text accompanying notes 34-43.
168. Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 911.
169. Id.at912.
170. Id.at913.
171. See id.
at908, 911-13.
172. Id.at899.
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involved in carrying out a basic service: operating a public school,
operating a prison, operating a military, and operating a postal service.1
The SEC however, being a regulator, does not itself carry out a basic
service; it does not issue or sell securities. 174 Rather, it looks over the
75
shoulders of those who do, telling them what is and is not permissible. 1
This function is a step removed from the kinds of functions that the
Court cited to as allowing for the necessary restriction of speech by the
government. 176 Rather, the SEC's role is much closer to the role of the
Federal Election Commission in Citizens United, a function that 77did not
justify the government's restriction of corporate political speech.

III. GUN JUMPING AND THE FREE SPEECH PROBLEM OF SECURITY
REGULATIONS

The conflict between the securities regulation regime and First
Amendment protections of corporate speech presents a particularly
troublesome dilemma because it pits two long-standing bodies of law
with meritorious purposes against each other. 78 The securities regulation
system is integral to the operation of an efficient and stable capital
market, while First Amendment protection is a core value of American
federalism. 179 Accordingly, a conflict between the two bodies of law
8
essentially forces a choice between two central values of our society. 0
Taking into account the rigid view of corporate political speech
protections under Citizens United, such a conflict will arise if the
offering of a security is politicized.1 8' Scholars
have, however, made
18 2
other.
each
with
two
the
attempts to reconcile
173. Id. (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986); Jones v. N.C.
Prisoners Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 759 (1974);
Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 557 (1973)).
174. See discussion supra Part II.A.
175. See discussion supra Part II.A.
176. Compare Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899, with discussion supra Part II.A.
177. Compare Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 896, 913 (noting that "the FEC's 'business is to
censor' (quoting Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57 (1965)), with supra notes 5-6 and
accompanying text.
178. Page & Yang, supra note 8, at 5-6 (identifying the importance of First Amendment rights
within American society and the rising specter of conflict with the area of the securities law).
179. Drury, supra note 8, at 765 (describing the long-time goals of the securities regulation
regime); Page & Yang, supra note 8, at 6.
180. See Page & Yang, supra note 8, at 3, 6.
181. See discussion infra Part III.D.
182. See, e.g., Drury, supra note 8, at 780, 785 (arguing sections of the securities laws that
forbid truthful, non-misleading speech should be struck down, but areas that require disclosure
upheld); Page & Yang, supra note 8, at 83 (arguing that Regulation Fair Disclosure should fail a
constitutional challenge); Siebecker, supra note 11, at 651 (arguing that courts should adopt an
institutional approach to First Amendment doctrine).
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The Court'sApproach to Free Speech and Securities Regulation

The Court has yet to substantively address the application of the
First Amendment to the securities regulation laws. 183 However, a
scattering of cases focused on other areas of First Amendment
application that have alluded to or mentioned the issue have led some
184
scholars to argue that a general securities exception already exists.
These cases would likely be the first line of defense to a constitutional
challenge to the gun jumping provisions of the Securities Act.
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n 185 is the earliest indication of a
general securities exception to the First Amendment. 186 In dictum, the
Ohralik Court stated that:
[I]t has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or
press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct
was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language,
either spoken, written, or printed ....

Numerous examples could be

cited of communications that are regulated without offending the First
Amendment, such as the exchange of information about
securities.... corporate proxy statements, ... the exchange of price

and production information among competitors.... and employers'
threats of retaliation for the labor activities of employees .... Each of
these examples illustrates that the State does not lose its power to
regulate commercial activity deemed harmful to the public whenever
speech is a component of that activity.187
Ohralik, however, was decided early on in the development of the
commercial speech doctrine, and commercial speech protections have
been applied more strictly since. 88 Further, the Court's statement seems
to assume that all speech related to securities exists solely within the
commercial speech doctrine and does not consider the conundrum that
pose under existing securities
mixed political-corporate speech would
89
and First Amendment jurisprudence.1
The Court's likely approach to a First Amendment challenge of the
securities regulations is further informed by Paris Adult Theatre I v.

183. Page, supra note 19, at 797.
184. See, e.g., Allen D. Boyer, Free Speech, Free Markets, and Foolish Consistency, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 474,495 (1992) (reviewing NICHOLAS WOLFSON, CORPORATE FIRST AMENDMENT

RIGHTS AND THE SEC (1990)); Page, supra note 19, at 797-802 (analyzing the Supreme Court's
treatment of securities regulation under the First Amendment).
185. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
186. Id. at 456.
187. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
188. Page, supra note 19, at 798.
189. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456.
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Slaton.'90 In that case, the Court noted that "both Congress and state
legislatures have.. . strictly regulated public expression by issuers of
and dealers in securities, profit sharing 'coupons,' and 'trading stamps,'
commanding what they must and must not publish and announce.,' 9
This statement is weakened, however, when taken in the context of the
preceding sentence, which states that "legislators and judges have acted
on various unprovable assumptions.' 92 It is somewhat less than a
ringing endorsement of the SEC's ability to regulate the public
expression of issuers to call it an "unprovable assumption." Also, the
fails to deal with the prospect of a politicized security
dictum again
193
offering.
Two more recent cases relatively on point, SEC v. Wall Street
Publishing Institute, Inc.' 94 and Lowe v. SEC,195 signal a retreat from
these previous absolutist views of securities regulation. Both cases
involved the application of the securities laws to financial industry
publications, and thus deal with situations in which the SEC is
attempting to regulate behavior that does not obviously fall solely within
the reach of the securities laws. 196 In Lowe, the Court skirted the
constitutional question by finding that the newsletter at issue fell within
a statutory exemption under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 for
"publishers of any bona fide newspaper, news magazine or business or
financial publication."' 197 However, the Court also noted that "it is
difficult to see why the expression of an opinion about a marketable
security should not... be protected," indicating that the First
Amendment could indeed be used to at least challenge parts of the
securities laws.

198

In Wall Street PublishingInstitute, the D.C. Circuit indicated that it
assumed that the exchange of information regarding securities received
190. 413 U.S. 49,61-62(1973).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 61.
193. See id. at 61-62.
194. 851 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
195. 472 U.S. 181 (1985).
196. See Lowe, 472 U.S. at 183; Wall St. Publ'g Inst., 851 F.2d at 366. It is notable that the
cases most closely dealing with the First Amendment implications of the securities laws arose in
situations in which issues of obvious concern to the SEC, namely the business of the securities
industry, were intertwined with greater issues of social concern-in these cases freedom of the
press. See Lowe, 472 U.S. at 183; Wall St. Publ'g Inst., 851 F.2d at 366. While the degree to which
the First Amendment limits the SEC's ability to exercise its substantial power under the securities
laws was not resolved in Lowe or Wall Street PublishingInstitute, it is clearly possible that the issue
will arise again in a similarly blurry set of facts, such as a case involving the issuance and promotion
of securities for purely political purposes. Page, supra note 19, at 798-800, 802.
197. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 208, 211 (internal quotation marks omitted).
198. Id. at 210 n.58.
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only limited First Amendment protection, but also noted that, in light of
Lowe, "it would be an overstatement to assert that the First Amendment
does not limit regulation in the securities field."' 99 The explicit
recognition in both Lowe and Wall Street Publishing Institute that the
First Amendment must limit securities regulations in some manner
stands in stark contrast to the absolutist exceptions suggested by Ohralik
and ParisAdult Theatre I and thus severely undermines arguments that
such a universal exception already exists. 200 Furthermore, the Court in
Wall Street PublishingInstitute, like in ParisAdult Theatre I, could only
assume to what degree the First Amendment constrains government
regulation under the securities laws, a result of the lack of any clear
precedent dealing with the issue. 20 ' Therefore, these cases show that the
degree to which the First Amendment imposes limits on securities
regulation remains an open question. 0 2
Indeed, the most recent case to touch on the issue, Full Value
Advisors, LLC v. SEC,20 3 illustrates that little has changed since Lowe
and Wall Street Publishing Institute were decided. 0 4 In Full Value
Advisors, LLC, an institutional investment manager challenged the
SEC's quarterly disclosure requirement on the basis that it was
compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment. °5 While the
Court in Full Value Advisors, LLC determined that the investment
manager's claims were not ripe, it proceeded to apply a rational basis
analysis to Section 13 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 in dicta,
concluding that the requirement of disclosure to the SEC alone did not
raise First Amendment concerns and that Section 13 had a rational basis
in both purpose and means.20 6 In supporting this conclusion, the Court
stated that "[slecurities regulation involves a different balance of
concerns and calls for different applications of First Amendment

199. Wall St. Publ'g Inst., 851 F.2d at 373. By assuming that securities regulations were
subject to only limited First Amendment review, the Court was adopting an approach taken by the
First Circuit years before in the Supreme Court's decision in Lowe. See id.; Bangor & Aroostook
R.R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 574 F.2d 1096, 1107 (1st Cir. 1978) ("Though first
amendment protection has lately been afforded some types of commercial speech .... the first
amendment has not yet been held to limit regulation in areas of extensive economic
supervision ... " (citations omitted)).
200. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978); Paris Adult Theater I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61-62 (1973).
201. See ParisAdult Theater 1, 413 U.S. at 61-62; Wall St. Publ'g Inst., 851 F.2d at 373; Page,
supra note 19, at 797.
202. See Page, supra note 19, at 799-800, 802.
203. 633 F.3d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3003 (2011).
204. Full Value Advisors, LLC, 633 F.3d at 1106-09.
205. Id. at 1104.
206. Id. at 1106-09.
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principles., 20 7 Further, the Court upheld the validity of the disclosure
requirements because they were indistinguishable from underlying
disclosure requirements in other areas of the law that are necessary for
the essential operation of the government.2 °8
While Full Value Advisors, LLC appears to provide some long
needed tangible guidance as to the limits imposed by the First
Amendment on the securities laws, the decision is much too limited to
usefully clarify the First Amendment's implications to the general
securities regulation regime. The claims at issue were not ripe and thus
were not before the court. 20 9 Additionally, the decision is premised on
language taken from non-majority opinions and simply does not address
the types of compelled and restricted speech that make up the majority of
the securities regulation regime, namely speech to the public at large
rather than to the SEC itself.210 However, Full Value Advisors, LLC does
indicate that courts today are likely to acknowledge that the First
Amendment at least applies in some way to the securities laws. 2 1 1 Thus,
even though First Amendment challenges to the securities regulation
regime have arisen in various cases, the courts have yet to directly
address the issue in any meaningful way.212

207. Id. at 1109 (quoting Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 678 (2003) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
208. Id. at 1109 (citing W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 645 (1943) (Murphy, J.,
concurring) ("[E]ssential operations of government may require [disclosure] for the preservation of
an orderly society .... ")).
209. Id. at 1106-07.
210. See id. at 1108-09.
211. See id. at 1109; see also Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 944-47 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding
that the SEC's anti-corruption Rule G-37 survived strict First Amendment scrutiny). Blount is an
interesting case in that the Court actually applied the First Amendment to an SEC rule that gave rise
to political speech concerns. Id. at 941, 944. SEC Rule G-37 was created to prevent "pay-to-play"
practices in the state municipal bond markets by prohibiting broker-dealers or municipal security
dealers from doing business with any public official that had received a campaign contribution from
the broker-dealer within two years of a proposed issue. Id. at 939-40. Without deciding what the
proper standard of review was, the Court found that the rule survived strict scrutiny due to a
compelling state interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption. Id. at 943-44.
Thus, while many of the themes discussed in this Note run through Blount as well, the interests that
were held to validate SEC Rule G-37 are completely different than the interests underlying the
broader securities regulation regime, and specifically the gun jumping provisions of the securities
laws. See supra notes 27, 35 and accompanying text. Additionally, the state interest in preventing
corruption or the appearance of corruption was one of the very interests that was found lacking in
Citizens United. See supra notes 159, 162 and accompanying text.
212. See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 208, 211 (1985); Full Value Advisors, LLC, 633 F.3d at
1107-09; Blount, 61 F.3d at 943-44; SEC v. Wall St. Publ'g Inst., Inc., 851 F.2d 365, 373 (D.C. Cir.
1988); see also SEC v. Siebel Sys., Inc., 384 F. Supp. 2d 694, 709 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (declining
to address the constitutional challenges raised as the complaint failed to state a claim).
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B. Arguments that Securities Regulation Violates Commercial Speech
Protections
Scholars have also argued that parts of the securities laws violate
the Constitution on various grounds. Professor Burt Neuborne argues
that large portions of the SEC's regulatory scheme could be susceptible
to First Amendment challenges under a hearer-centered conception of
First Amendment protections.213 In particular, Professor Neubome
targets three areas of SEC speech regulation: the licensing and regulation
of investment newsletters, the regulation of proxy solicitations, and the
regulation of information in primary and secondary markets.214
In broad form, Professor Neuborne's central First Amendment
critique of the SEC's prophylactic approach to speech is merely that an
allegation by the SEC that certain speech is potentially misleading
simply should not be enough to justify its suppression if the public really
does have a constitutionally protected interest in being better
informed. 15 He further points out that the single support for the SEC's
frequent choice to use more restrictive alternatives than necessary in
regulating speech in the securities markets is the assumption that almost
total deference should be given to SEC judgment.21 6 That assumption,
Professor Neuborne argues, is anathema to a hearer-centered conception
of the First Amendment, and "censorship rules [that] are applied to stifle
speech that would be useful to hearers today in the name of protecting
hearers tomorrow" should be struck down.217
Professor Neuborne also specifically addresses the difficulty with
which the gun jumping provisions of the Securities Act can be
reconciled with the First Amendment, stating that it is indeed
"impossible to square existing SEC restrictions on the scope and timing
of pre- and post-prospectus promotional speech involving new issues
with a hearer-centered theory of free speech. 2 18 Despite the verve with
which Professor Neuborne argues that various practices of the SEC are
unconstitutional, he concludes that challenges to suspect provisions of
the securities laws are unlikely to arise because everyone but the public

213. Neubome, supra note 8, at 41.
214. Id. at42.
215. Id. at49.
216. Id.at 52.
217. Id.at 53.
218. Id. at 61. Professor Neuborne continues on to hypothesize that, as a result of the SEC's
significant restrictions on speech, the simplification of information available to the market regarding
new issues has only served to foster a black market of rumors and insider generated tips while
assuring that sanctioned sources of information are of only limited use to the majority of the primary
capital market. Id.
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has a vested interest in maintaining the current system. 2 19 This
conclusion
is undercut by more recent developments in law and public
0
22

policy.
Professors Antony Page and Katy Yang argue that Regulation Fair
Disclosure ("Regulation FD") 22' violates the First Amendment because it
targets speech directly without a requirement of harmful conduct or even
a likelihood of harmful conduct, when it could have opted to target the
harmful conduct itself.222 Regulation FD requires issuers to reveal
material nonpublic information that has been purposefully or
accidentally revealed to certain enumerated persons that are considered
likely to trade on the information. 22223 The goal of the regulation was to
target trading based on selective disclosure by an issuer that fell outside
of the Rule lOb-5 insider trading prohibitions.2 24 Professors Page and
Yang note that because the speech itself is targeted, and not the resulting
trading, the regulation is overinclusive, applying to speech that does not
result in trading or harm as well as speech conveying information that is
not used at all. 225 Citing the premise that "[i]f the First Amendment
means anything, it means that regulating speech must be a last, not first,
resort[,]" Professors Page and Yang outline several less restrictive
alternatives to the approach chosen by the SEC, such as introducing a
fraud-based regulation requiring a personal benefit rather than the mere
possession of information.226
This argument easily extends to the gun jumping provisions of the
securities laws. Just as Regulation FD is overinclusive, the gun jumping
provisions are also overinclusive because they suppress all information
viewed as arousing public interest in a security in the hope of protecting
the autonomous choice of simple investors, which could include virtually
any positive information about a corporation, regardless of whether that

219. Id. at 62-63. Professor Neubome suggests that challenges are unlikely to crop up because
the current system affords the SEC an illusion of power and the public with false assurances that the
markets are being "scrupulously policed." Id. at 62. Corporations, meanwhile, may simply pass on
the cost of regulation to the consumer. Id. at 62-63. This conclusion carries significantly less weight
now that the public's impression of market regulators has been shattered in the wake of the Bernard
Madoff Ponzi scheme and the fall of Lehman Brothers. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Merrill Is Sold:
Failing to Find Buyer, Lehman Set to File for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, at Al; David
Stout, Report Details How Madoff's Web EnsnaredS.E.C., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2009, at B 1.
220. See discussion infra Part III.D.
221. 17C.F.R. §243.100 (2011).
222. Page & Yang, supra note 8, at 76, 78.
223. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a); Page & Yang, supra note 8, at 11-13.
224. Page & Yang, supra note 8, at 10-11.
225. ld. at 76-77.
226. Id. at 78-79 (quoting Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 373 (2002))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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information may actually be useful to, or desired by, the market.227 Less
restrictive alternatives exist to the current gun jumping prohibitions. One
approach would be to develop rules that allow sophisticated investors
access to more information while singling out simple investors for
greater protection. 228 Accordingly, Professors Page and Yang's argument
as to the unconstitutionality of Regulation FD applies at least as strongly
229
to the gun jumping provisions.
Professor Lloyd L. Drury argues that sections of the securities law,
such as the gun jumping provisions, would fail under a commercial
speech challenge because they limit truthful speech without
substantively enhancing investor protections.23 ° Professor Drury notes
that the suppression of truthful speech is treated as highly suspect by the
Court, even in highly regulated fields afforded only the lesser protection
of the commercial speech doctrine. 231 Additionally, Professor Drury
argues that the gun jumping rules would fail the Central Hudson test if
challenged, as the SEC would be unable to show that less intrusive
means could not achieve the same goals.232
If the gun jumping rules likely violate the First Amendment in the
context of the weaker commercial speech doctrine, then the gun jumping
provisions are even more likely to violate the First Amendment in the
context of higher political speech protections.2 33 Within the political
speech context, the SEC would not have to merely show that the
regulations are not more expansive than necessary, but that they are
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. 234 This may be
an insurmountable task considering the broad prophylactic approach
chosen by the SEC under the gun jumping provisions.235
C. Arguments that Free Speech ProtectionsShould Not Apply to
Securities Regulations
Some scholars have attempted to counter arguments that large parts
the
securities laws are unconstitutional by providing various rationales
of
for the securities laws being excepted from First Amendment review.
Professor Arthur R. Pinto, responding to Professor Neubome, argues that

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

See Neubome, supra note 8, at 54, 61; supra Part II.A.
Neubome, supra note 8, at 55-56.
See Page & Yang, supra note 8, at 76, 78-79.
Drury, supra note 8, at 780-82.
Id. at 767, 782.
Id. at 782.
See id.; Siebecker, supra note 11, at 636.
See supra notes 92, 107 and accompanying text.
See Neubome, supra note 8, at 61.
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substantial deference should be given to the SEC's regulatory structure,
essentially because of the nature of capital markets and the substantial
risks associated with a breakdown in the markets. 6 According to
Professor Pinto, because issues of capital formation trigger important
policy issues, the policing of the capital markets is difficult, and speech
is inherently a part of all illegal schemes, the issue should be left to the
executive branch entirely in order to avoid courts becoming "the arbiters
of economic policy. ' '237 In other words, Professor Pinto contends that
these decisions should be left to the experts in the form of Congress and
the SEC.238 This argument, however, runs directly contrary to the
Court's anti-paternalistic view of acceptable government regulation and
is therefore unlikely to save the gun jumping provisions of the securities
laws upon direct challenge.239
Professor Michael R. Siebecker argues for an "institutional
approach" to the First Amendment and its interaction with securities
regulation. 240 He contends that such an approach justifies the significant
regulation of corporate political speech for the purpose of preserving
market integrity. 241 An institutional approach to the First Amendment
evaluates the importance of an institution, and then weighs the effect of a
proposed change in speech protections on that institution in deciding
whether to make the change.242 For Professor Siebecker, the importance
of securities to American life-facilitating corporate ownership and
control, allowing government and businesses to raise capital, and an
investment for individuals-extends to securities regulation. 243 Thus,
because securities are of vast importance to American society, protecting
the securities market through regulation is equally important.2 4
Furthermore, Professor Siebecker argues that securities regulation
depends on speech restrictions to prevent fraud, market manipulation,

236. Pinto, supra note 8, at 102-03.
237. Id. at 98-99.
238. Id. at 98.
239. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996) (plurality
opinion) ("The First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep
people in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good."); Basic Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 234 (1988) ("Disclosure, and not paternalistic withholding of accurate
information, is the policy chosen and expressed by Congress.").
240. Siebecker, supra note 11, at 651; see also Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional
First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REv. 1256, 1271-73 (2005) [hereinafter Towards an Institutional

FirstAmendment] (arguing for an institutional approach to the First Amendment as a whole).
241. Siebecker, supra note 11,at 651.
242. Id. at 649-50.
243. Id. at 651-52.
244. Id. at 652.
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insider trading, and other issues.245 The combination of the importance
of the securities regulation regime and its dependence on speech
restrictions, according to Professor Siebecker, justifies greater speech
246
regulation in the securities setting.
Professor Siebecker's argument, however, can be seen to cut both
ways. When regulation is accomplished through prohibition, the market
is at risk of being cut off from the very securities that are so important to
American life. 247 Accordingly, the vast importance of securities may also
be seen as a reason the courts should act as a check against overzealous
and overbroad securities regulation.248 Additionally, the Supreme Court
appears to have already forsaken this institutional analysis and is
therefore unlikely to adopt it in the future.249
D. Citizens United, the Politicizationof CorporateSpeech, and
Securities Regulation
The Court's decision in Citizens United greatly informs the
applicability of previous arguments about the constitutionality of
securities regulations today, and provides significant ammunition for
arguments that sections of the securities regulations are in fact
unconstitutional.25 ° Indeed, Citizens United has accelerated an already
present trend toward the increased politicization of corporate speech,
increasing the likelihood that the Court will have to address
251
constitutional challenges to the securities regulation regime. Various

245. Id. at 654.
246. Id.
247. See Neuborne, supra note 8, at 61 (stating that overregulation may lead to greater market
manipulation by insiders).
248. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L.
REv. 763, 777, 787 (1995) (discussing the SEC's prohibition of projections in disclosure
documents); Page & Yang, supra note 8, at 26-27 (discussing why the selective disclosure by
issuers targeted by Regulation FD may be desirable). The SEC's prohibition of projections is a
particularly useful example of the ills that may be borne of an unchecked regulator. See Dnury,
supra note 8, at 783. Projections were originally banned because they were thought to be easily
manipulated and confusing to investors. Id. Investors, however, placed a high value on prospective
information since the value of a security to an investor is entirely based on its future performance.
Id. Thus, the SEC had prohibited speech in the name of protecting those who most wanted to hear it.
See id. It took the SEC ten years to rectify the policy, and the disclosure of projections is now
encouraged. 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (2011); Drury, supra note 8, at 784.
249. Highberger, supra note 11, at 2156-60 (discussing cases in which the Court seems to
reject the institutional approach).
250. See supra notes 156-62 and accompanying text.
251. Siebecker, supra note 11, at 621-28 (discussing the increased mixing of commercial and
political speech in the corporate context); Michael Luo, Changes Have Money Talking Louder Than
Ever in Midterms, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2010, at Al 3 (discussing the substantial increase in political
spending by corporations since the Citizens United decision).
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cases unrelated to the securities regulation regime have already
demonstrated the utility of mixed commercial and political speech to
corporate speakers.2 52
Nike, Inc. v. Kasky 53 provides an illustrative example of the
potential benefits to corporations of characterizing mixed speech as
political.2 54 In Nike, a corporation defended against claims of false and
misleading statements made about its labor practices by arguing that the
First Amendment barred the claim since the statements were part of a
public dialogue on a matter of public concern, thus making it protected
speech.25 5 Two state courts agreed with the corporation's defense before
the Supreme Court granted and then dismissed its writ of certiorari as
improvidently granted.2 56 Nike shows, however, that corporations may
have a powerful incentive to mix politics with corporate speech in order
to avoid the substantial burden and cost of compliance with regulations,
an incentive that would certainly apply to avoiding the securities
regulations.257
In general, corporations likely have an incentive to engage in
corporate political activities such as lobbying, making campaign
contributions, and operating governmental relations offices. 258 Empirical
evidence suggests that increased corporate political activity correlates to
increased firm performance.2 5 9 Thus, not only do corporations have an
incentive to tinge their activities with political speech in order to protect
themselves from regulatory action, but increased corporate political
activity also appears, perhaps unsurprisingly, to increase corporate

252. See, e.g., Sosa v. DirecTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 929, 931-33, 942 (9th Cir. 2006) (allowing
a satellite television company to escape RICO liability on grounds that demand letters it sent were
protected speech); CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Skippy Inc., 214 F.3d 456, 462-63 (4th Cir. 2000) (protecting a
corporation from an injunction because statements on its website regarding a failed trademark and
copyright dispute were not commercial speech and thus protected under the First Amendment);
Bernardo v. Planned Parenthood Fed. of Am., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 197, 214-15, 228-29 (Ct. App. 2004)
(striking suit against a non-profit organization for publishing allegedly false statements under a state
statute because the court determined that the speech at issue was political rather than commercial);
DuPont Merck Pharm. Co. v. Superior Court, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755, 758-59 (Ct. App. 2000)
(determining that a corporation's lobbying and public relations efforts were political speech within
the protection of a state statute). See also Tamara R. Piety, Grounding Nike: Exposing Nike's Quest
for a ConstitutionalRight to Lie, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 151, 189-92 (2005) (describing various contexts
in which a corporation could claim political speech rights to avoid regulation).
253. 539 U.S. 654 (2003).
254. See id. at 656-57.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 656-58.
257. Siebecker, supra note 11, at 627-28.
258. See Sean Lux et al., Mixing Business with Politics: A Meta-Analysis of the Antecedents
and Outcomes of CorporatePoliticalActivity,37 J. MGMT. 223, 223-24, 239 (2011).
259. Id. at 239.
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profits.2 60 Now, armed with the Court's decision in Citizens United,
corporations are likely to increase their political activities and the
political speech that goes with those activities. 261 Accordingly, the
prospect of corporations bringing serious challenges to a range of
governmental regulations under the First Amendment, and under the
strict protections of the political speech doctrine specifically, appears
increasingly likely.262 Therefore, the conflict between corporate political
speech doctrine and the nature of the securities regulation regime is more
prescient then ever.
IV.

CURRENTLY, LIMITATIONS ON CORPORATE SPEECH IN THE FORM
OF GUN JUMPING PROVISIONS VIOLATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT

Taken as a whole, previous arguments as to the unconstitutionality
of sections of the securities regulation regime, the increased
politicization of corporate speech and activity, and the Court's robust
articulation of corporate free speech in Citizens United, require the
conclusion that the gun jumping provisions of the securities laws are
263
likely to be found unconstitutional under a political speech analysis.
Furthermore, it is increasingly likely that such a challenge will be
brought before the Court. 264 Indeed, it is not difficult to imagine a fact
pattern that would trigger a strong political speech challenge to the gun
265
jumping restrictions.
What if, for example, Bill Gates were to register a Delaware entity
named "Elections are U.S., Inc.," wholly owned by Microsoft, with the
stated business purpose of undertaking legal activities to influence and
guide the American political process towards policies that heavily favor
American technology companies? 266 In order to further fund this cause,
260. See id.; Siebecker, supra note 11, at 627-28.
261. Lux et al., supra note 258, at 239.
262. See supra notes 252-59 and accompanying text. The fact that a similar case has recently
been brought before the Massachusetts courts is further indicative of the increasing popularity of
this kind of challenge. See Bulldog Investors Gen. P'ship v. Sec'y of the Commonwealth, 953
N.E.2d 691, 694-95 (Mass. 2011) (noting that a hedge fund sought an injunction against the
Massachusetts state securities regulator on grounds that the state enforcement action violated the
fund's First Amendment rights). The court in Bulldog Investors upheld the restriction, determining
that it satisfied the Central Hudson test. Id. at 714.
263. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 900, 903-05, 908, 911-13 (2010); Neubome,
supra note 8, at 61-62 (arguing that "significant aspects ... are vulnerable to hearer-centered first
amendment attack"); Page & Yang, supra note 8, at 83-84; Siebecker, supra note 11, at 674; supra
Part Il1.
264. See supra notes 258-62 and accompanying text.
265. See Brian J. M. Quinn, CorporateFree Speech, M & A LAW PROF BLOG (Jan. 22, 2010),
http:/Ilawprofessors.typepad.com/mergers/2010/01/corporate-free-speech.html.
266. See id.
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Gates assigns interests in the revenue streams of various profitable
aspects of Microsoft's business to the new entity and starts gearing up
for an imminent IPO to let all the other tech companies contribute to the
cause. As part of the IPO preparations, the new entity engages in a
nation-wide advertising campaign that lists the true date, price, and
purpose of the soon-to-be-offered security, and directs interested buyers
to contact various broker-dealers. Seeing this clear case of gun jumping
by a major corporation, the SEC quickly brings an enforcement action
against the new corporation and the corporation defends on political
speech grounds. How would the case play out? Faced with regulations
that prohibit truthful speech and the Supreme Court's strong language in
Citizens United, a court would most likely find the gun jumping
regulations unconstitutional as applied to inherently political corporate
speech.267
A.

Gun Jumping ProvisionsSuppress Truthful Speech

The gun jumping provisions of the securities laws are particularly
vulnerable under the corporate political speech doctrine because they
both compel and restrict truthful speech in the name of protecting those
who would hear the speech.268 Accordingly, the gun jumping provisions
of the securities laws would not survive the strict 269
scrutiny standard that
analysis.
speech
political
a
under
applied
be
would
Courts have repeatedly expressed distaste for the very kind of
paternalistic prohibition of truthful speech that the gun jumping
provisions embody. 270 As one court phrased it, "[t]o endeavor to support
a restriction upon speech by alleging that the recipient needs to be
shielded from that speech for his or her own protection ...is practically
an engraved invitation to have the restriction struck.",271 The gun
jumping provisions are exactly that, a restriction on corporate speech in
the form of offers, as broadly defined, for the purpose of protecting the
public from being persuaded to buy a potentially bad security based on
information other than the prospectus information compelled by the

267. See discussion infra Part IV.A-B.
268. See Neuborne, supra note 8, at 53-54; supranotes 36-43 and accompanying text.
269. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S.Ct. 876, 898 (2010); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S.
224, 234 (1988) (articulating the Court's anti-paternalistic view of speech in general, as well as in a
securities setting); Page & Yang, supra note 8, at 83-84.
270. See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
271. Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 70 (D.D.C. 1998), amended by 36 F.
Supp. 2d 418 (D.D.C. 1999), vacated in partsub nom.Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331
(D.C. Cir. 2000).
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SEC.272 If "[d]isclosure, and not paternalistic withholding of accurate
information, is the policy chosen and expressed by Congress," then the
gun jumping restrictions are clearly inconsistent with the congressional
27
mandate of the securities laws. 2 Accordingly, arguments to uphold the
gun jumping restrictions would likely fail in the face of the Court's
distaste for paternalistic regulation.274
Additionally, it is unclear that restrictions on truthful speech
actually benefit the market.275 According to the Efficient Capital Market
Hypothesis, the capital markets are efficient in the processing of
publically available information, almost instantaneously reflecting new
information in market prices. 22766 This hypothesis has been so widely
accepted by both the courts and academics that it is now accepted as the
default context in which securities regulation must be discussed.277
Within the context of this hypothesis, the more accurate information
supplied to the market the better because it means stock prices will be as
278
accurate as possible when traders enter into a transaction.
Accordingly, the SEC's restrictions on truthful speech may in fact harm
the market by reducing the amount of accurate information available,
thereby reducing market efficiency. 279 Therefore, there is even less
motivation for courts to carve out a securities exception from First
Amendment doctrine in the context of the gun jumping restrictions.28 °
B.

Gun Jumping and the High Standard of Citizens United

Finally, if a challenge in a specific securities regulation case
successfully triggers political speech protections, the high standard of
protection articulated in Citizens United makes it all but impossible for a

272. See Neuborne, supra note 8, at 53-54; supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
273. See Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 234.
274. See id.; Siebecker, supranote 11, at 642.
275. See Chiappinelli, supra note 12, at 497-99; Page, supra note 19, at 824; Highberger, supra
note 11, at 2170.
276. Chiappinelli, supra note 12, at 497-98. This version of the Efficient Capital Market
Hypothesis is known as the "semi-strong form" of the hypothesis. Id. at 498 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
277. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA.
L. REV. 549, 549-50 (1984). See also Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 241-42 (basing its discussion of the
fraud-on-the-market theory on the Efficient Market Hypothesis). But see Paul Krugman, How Did
Economists Get It So Wrong?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2009 (Magazine), at 36 (describing how the
recession has shaken the foundation of the economic establishment, including the Efficient Capital
Market Hypothesis).
278. Chiappinelli, supra note 12, at 497-98.
279. Id. at 497-99.
280. See id. at 498-99.
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regulation on speech to survive strict scrutiny. 28 1 Because the gun
jumping restrictions affect such a wide swath of speech, including
truthful speech, it already seems unlikely that any court would find the
provisions to be narrowly tailored to the purpose of protecting the
markets as required under strict scrutiny review.282 Indeed, various less
restrictive alternatives to the more heavy-handed restrictions put in place
by the SEC have been suggested.28 3 When the rhetoric of Citizens United
is added on top of this already lofty standard of protection, there appears
to be no room left to rationalize a securities exception to political
corporate speech protections. 2 Indeed, what was previously seen as one
of the only significant exceptions to the lofty protections of political
speech was the very precedent that Citizens United overturned. 285 Rather,
in dealing with a politicized IPO like the one outlined in the "Elections
are U.S., Inc." example,28 6 courts would be bound to the principle that
"[n]o sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political
speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations. 28 7 In the case of gun
jumping regulations, restrictions on truthful speech simply cannot be
squared with the Court's opinion in Citizens United.288
While this Note has argued that the gun jumping restrictions cannot
survive-and perhaps should not survive-a challenge under the
political speech doctrine of the First Amendment, more worrisome is the
prospect of the general disclosure sections of the securities regulation
regime falling victim to a similar challenge.2 89 Indeed, the Court seems
to treat all non-commercial speech as protected speech generally,
regardless of whether the regulation at issue seeks to prohibit or compel

281. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S.Ct. 876, 903-905, 908 (2010); supra notes 165-71 and
accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 37-43, 107 and accompanying text.
283. See Page, supra note 19, at 815-16 (arguing that self-regulation or optional regulation in
conjunction with market forces would provide adequate protection to the capital markets); Page &
Yang, supra note 8, at 79 (arguing that Congress and the SEC should target the trading that results
from selective disclosure rather than regulating selective disclosure itself); Highberger, supra note
II. at 2170 (arguing that mandatory disclaimers or warnings, in conjunction with existing antifraud
provisions, would be sufficient to protect the capital markets).
284. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 907 ("Factions should be checked by permitting them all
to speak.... and by entrusting the people to judge what is true and what is false." (citation
omitted)).
285. See id. at 913 (overruling McConnell); Siebecker, supra note 11, at 636 (stating that the
level of protection given to corporate political speech changes in the context of impending
elections).
286. See supra notes 266-67 and accompanying text.
287. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
288. See id. at 900, 903-05,907-08, 911-13.
289. See supranotes 233-35 and accompanying text.
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speech.2 90 Therefore, if a corporation did manage to saturate an IPO with
political speech, the corporation could possibly evade the entire
securities regulation regime. 29 However, given the sordid history of
predominantly unregulated markets, even those who have argued for the
unconstitutionality of parts of the securities laws urge the upholding of
29
Accordingly, the rigid language of
the general disclosure regime.2
corporate free speech adopted by the Court in Citizens United must be
tempered in order to make room for a jurisprudential solution that strikes
at the unnecessary prohibition of truthful speech, but still provides
enough flexibility to allow securities regulators to ensure the stability
and relative safety of the capital markets.
V.

TOWARD A SOLUTION

First Amendment doctrine should be developed to avoid
undermining the current system of securities regulation. The Court
should do so by retreating from the absolutist interpretation of the First
Amendment espoused by Citizens United, and recognizing that some
governmental interests, particularly the stability of the capital markets,
are substantial enough to regulate speech that may contain political
qualities. 93 To do so, the Court must limit Citizens United to its facts, or
even overrule it, as the language utilized by the Court in Citizens United
would likely prove fatal to any regulation seeking to restrict corporate
political speech no matter the governmental interest. 294 Additionally,
there should be an acknowledgment within corporate political speech
290. See Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796-97 (1988) ("There is
certainly some difference between compelled speech and compelled silence, but in the context of
protected speech, the difference is without constitutional significance, for the First Amendment
guarantees 'freedom of speech,' a term necessarily comprising the decision of both what to say and
what not to say.").
291. See id.
292. See Drury, supra note 8, at 785-86; Neubome, supra note 8, at 62; Page, supra note 19, at
829.
293. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 945-46 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
294. See id. at 913; supra notes 162-71 and accompanying text. One court has attempted
interpret Citizens United more narrowly. In Western Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Attorney General
of the State of Montana, the Supreme Court of Montana upheld the constitutionality of a state law
that parallels the law held unconstitutional in Citizens United. 2011 WL 6888567, at *15 (Mont.
Dec. 30, 2011). The court held that the unique features of the State of Montana's law, elections, and
history created a compelling state interest "to impose the challenged rationally-tailored statutory
restrictions." Id at *5, 15. On February 17, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court stayed the holding. Am.
Tradition P'ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 2012 WL 521107, at *1 (Feb. 17, 2012). Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer stated that this case could "give the Court an opportunity to consider whether, in light of the
huge sums currently deployed to buy candidates' allegiance, Citizens United should continue to hold
sway." Id.
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jurisprudence that there is such a thing as too much free speech. 295 For
example, political speech would be overprotected if politically motivated
individuals who instruct others to commit mass physical harm were
given the same speech protections as individuals speaking before a live
audience.296 When this kind of unreasonable equality is enforced by the
courts, "serious questions arise as to whether courts have overlooked
important historical, structural, economic, and cultural differences
297
among the various channels and institutions of communication.,
Clearly such questions are raised by the Court's decision in Citizens
United.298
In order to account for the many competing interests that are
inevitably present in a corporate political free speech case, the Court
should adopt a broad balancing standard that would enable a court to
take into account the specific facts and existent interests of each case and
determine the appropriate amount of protection to be afforded under the
First Amendment. To do so, however, the Court need not further
complicate First Amendment jurisprudence by creating yet another legal
standard. Instead, the Court should simply apply the current standard of
the commercial speech doctrine set forth in CentralHudson to corporate
political speech cases.299
Applying the Central Hudson test would provide room for
balancing the competing interests necessary to square First Amendment
doctrine with the necessity of significant government regulation in the
securities laws while still offering meaningful First Amendment
protections. This is accomplished by the second, third, and fourth prongs
of the Central Hudson test, which allow a restriction on speech to be
constitutional if there exists a substantial government interest that
supports the restriction, the restriction directly advances the government
interest, and the restriction is no more expansive than necessary to serve
the government interest. 300 An added benefit to this approach is that by
applying the Central Hudson standard the Court would tap into existing
commercial speech doctrine precedent, thereby avoiding the period of
uncertainty that would occur if corporations had to wait for courts to
develop precedent interpreting a new standard.3 ' Additionally, applying
295.
296.
297.
298.
note 240,
299.
300.
301.
991,1011

See Towards an InstitutionalFirstAmendment, supra note 240, at 1271.
See id.
Id.
See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913; Towards an Institutional First Amendment, supra
at 1271.
See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, ConstitutionalShowdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REv.
(2008).
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the commercial speech doctrine to corporate political speech cases
makes intuitive sense, as it is consistent with the common-sense view of
corporations as economic entities.3 °2
On the other hand, the SEC can attain its goals of adequate
disclosure and investor protection without using the gun jumping
provisions of the securities laws in violation of the First Amendment.30 3
Instead, the disclosure regime already in place is sufficient in fulfilling
the central purpose of the securities regulation regime, "to substitute a
philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and
thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities
industry., 30 4 While the concern is that the mere existence of truthful
speech currently banned under the gun jumping provisions could mislead
investors, it is difficult to see where the damages would lie.30 5
Any purchase or sale of a security on the secondary market,
according to the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, has already
processed most publicly available information into the stock price. 306
The only time that a stock price has not been subjected to market forces,
which serve to protect investors by efficiently processing information
30 7
and arriving at an accurate market price, is in the context of an IPO.
However, the parties purchasing shares as part of an IPO are rarely the
308
vulnerable investors whom the securities laws were meant to protect.
Rather, underwriters allocate original IPO shares to their regular
customers, generally large institutional investors who do not need the
same kind of scrupulous protection that retail investors do.309
Accordingly, the gun jumping provisions appear to provide little
protection to those who need it, while still placing a significant burden
on the exercise of First Amendment rights.3 10
Instead, the current regime of mandated disclosure together with
increased antifraud enforcement of actual wrongdoers can still
meaningfully ensure the proper functioning of the markets without
impermissibly treading on corporate First Amendment rights by

302. See Editorial, The Rights of Corporations,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2009, at A30.
303. See Drury, supra note 8, at 782.
304. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 234 (1988) (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
305. See Drury, supra note 8, at 782.
306. See supranote 276 and accompanying text.
307. See Christine Hurt, Moral Hazard and the Initial Public Offering, 26 CARDOZO L. REV.
711, 714-15 (2005).
308. See COX ET AL., supra note 6, at 6; Hurt, supra note 307, at 715.

309.

See Cox ET AL., supra note 6, at 266 (discussing the private offering exemption for

sophisticated investors); Hurt, supra note 307, at 715.
310. See supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text.
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prohibiting truthful speech through the gun jumping provisions of the
securities laws. 3t ' Such reliance on compelled disclosure is substantially
less likely to run afoul of First Amendment protections. 1 2 Indeed, even
the Court in Citizens United found that the disclosure requirements of
the BCRA were constitutional as applied.31 3 If the SEC relied on the
disclosure and antifraud aspects of the current securities law regime
instead of the gun jumping provisions, because the SEC would no longer
be banning truthful corporate speech on the basis that the speech may
potentially be harmful, this approach would restore upon the SEC the
"conventional regulatory burden of distinguishing the truthful from the
false, the helpful from the misleading, and the harmless from the
harmful. 314 Such a return to regulatory normalcy would erase the
current constitutional conflict created by the gun jumping provisions of
the securities laws and may even result in increased market efficiency."'
VI.

CONCLUSION

The incompatibility of much of the current securities regulation
structure with the First Amendment, particularly sections like the gun
jumping provisions that repress truthful corporate speech, increasingly
seems less like a purely intellectual concern.3 16 While the issue has yet to
be directly addressed by the Court more than 120 years after
constitutional protections were extended to corporations, recent events
have increasingly made this topic part of the fabric of everyday life.317 In
the wake of the Great Recession of 2008, a renewed emphasis has been
given to the regulation of the markets, and the SEC is quickly moving to
318
increase its control over issuers and the capital markets.
Simultaneously, however, in the wake of the Court's decision in Citizens
United, corporations are embarking on a fete of political speech through
the use of their general funds. 3 19 Questions as to where the limits of each
rest seem inevitable.32 ° While the proper nature of the interplay between
311. See Drury, supra note 8, at 782; Highberger, supra note 11, at 2170.
312. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 915 (2010).
313. Id.at 916.
314. See Highberger, supra note 11, at 2169 (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 646 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
315. See supra notes 252-54, 278-80 and accompanying text.
316. See supra Part III.D.
317. See supra Part III.A.
318. See Mark Schoeff Jr., Schapiro: SEC Can't Enforce Dodd-Frank Rules Without More
Bucks, INVESTMENT NEWS (Feb. 17, 2011, 3:53 PM ET), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/
20110217/FREE/I 10219924.
319. See Luo, supra note 251.
320. See supra Part III.A.
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the First Amendment and securities regulations has been broached
before, the articulation of a broad and irreproachable corporate political
speech doctrine in Citizens United suggests that the Court would strike
down significant portions of the current securities regulations regime.321
When 22it comes to the gun jumping provisions, that may not be a bad
thing.
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